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ABSTRACT 
A converging operations approach using response time distribution modeling was 
adopted to better characterize the cognitive control dynamics underlying ongoing task 
cost and cue detection in event based prospective memory (PM). In Experiment 1, 
individual differences analyses revealed that working memory capacity uniquely 
predicted nonfocal cue detection, while proactive control and inhibition predicted 
variation in ongoing task cost of the ex-Gaussian parameter associated with continuous 
monitoring strategies (mu). In Experiments 2A and 2B, quasi-experimental techniques 
aimed at identifying the role of proactive control abilities in PM monitoring and cue 
detection suggested that low ability participants may have PM deficits during demanding 
tasks due to inefficient monitoring strategies, but that emphasizing importance of the 
intention can increase reliance on more efficacious monitoring strategies that boosts 
performance (Experiment 2A). Furthermore, high proactive control ability participants 
are able to efficiently regulate their monitoring strategies under scenarios that do not 
require costly monitoring for successful cue detection (Experiment 2B). In Experiments 
3A and 3B, it was found that proactive control benefited cue detection in interference-
rich environments, but the neural correlates of cue detection or intention execution did 
not differ when engaged in proactive versus reactive control. The results from the current 
set of studies highlight the importance of response time distribution modeling in 
understanding PM cost. Additionally, these results have important implications for extant 
theories of PM and have considerable applied ramifications concerning the cognitive 
control processes that should be targeted to improve PM abilities. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Event-based prospective memory (PM) refers to relying on environmental cues to 
trigger retrieval of a deferred action plan from long-term memory. Consequently, PM 
requires an intimate balance between attention and memory processes that are necessary 
for monitoring the environment for the occurrence of cues and remembering the contents 
of the previously established intention. Perhaps one of the most widely demonstrated PM 
findings is that cost to ongoing task processing (e.g., slower responding) often occurs as a 
result of possessing an intention for future action relative to when the same task is 
performed with no intention (Smith, Hunt, McVay, & McConnell, 2007). Observed costs 
suggest that some capacity-consuming cognitive control process has been enacted to 
support PM cue detection and action retrieval, thereby reducing the executive resources 
available to support ongoing task processing (Marsh, Cook, Hansen, & Pallos, 2003). 
Despite the abundance of research investigating the conditions under which PM control 
processes are active (e.g., McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), relatively little is known about 
the nature of these control processes or the regularity in which they are enacted. Thus, 
the purpose of the current set of studies was to use a converging operations approach in 
conjunction with response time (RT) distribution modeling to better characterize the role 
of various control processes in ongoing task processing and cue detection. 
Prospective Memory Monitoring Processes 
In a typical event-based PM task, following the completion of practice with a 
particular ongoing task (control block) participants form an intention to perform a 
specific action upon encountering specific cues during the subsequent ongoing task 
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(experimental block). For example, upon completing practice of a lexical decision task 
(LDT), participants are additionally given the PM instruction to press the “/” key after 
making their lexical decision any time an animal word (e.g., dog) occurs during a 
subsequent LDT. Cost analyses are generally derived from ongoing lexical decision 
latencies by comparing mean RTs between control and experimental blocks. Cost to 
ongoing task processing occurs when mean response latencies (on non-cue trials) are 
slower in the experimental than the control block. It is generally assumed that cost arises 
because ongoing and PM task demands draw on the same pool of limited executive 
resources, so as more resources are devoted to noticing cues, response latencies increase 
due to fewer resources being available for ongoing task processing (Marsh et al., 2003).  
Although the majority of extant theories of event-based PM assume that similar 
capacity-consuming control processes involved in monitoring for cues underlie cost 
effects in PM tasks, they differ in their supposition as to whether such processes are 
always necessary for successful PM retrieval. The preparatory attentional and memory 
(PAM) process theory posits that resource-demanding control processes are always 
needed to engage target-checking processes to determine whether or not the current 
stimulus requires a PM response (Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2007). The two-process 
model of strategic monitoring additionally assumes that cost may arise from maintenance 
of a mental task set that treats ongoing task stimuli as potential PM retrieval cues (Guynn, 
2003). Importantly, these theories generally assume that possessing an intention should 
always produce cost regardless of the nature of the ongoing or PM task demands.  
 Alternatively, the multiprocess view posits that although preparatory attentional 
processes are enacted to support cue detection under many circumstances, there are 
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certain instances in which PM retrieval can occur spontaneously (i.e., without 
engagement of executive processing; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). For example, PM 
retrieval can occur spontaneously (i.e., without cost) when there is only a single PM cue 
(Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2008) or during focal processing conditions (Einstein & McDaniel, 
2005). Focal processing occurs when the ongoing task processing orients attention to the 
features of the PM cue (e.g., respond to “dog” during a LDT), whereas nonfocal 
processing occurs when the type of ongoing processing does not overlap with those 
required to process cues (e.g., respond to any animal during LDT). Spontaneous retrieval 
can occur via one of two mechanisms: 1) A reflexive-associative process may elicit 
spontaneous retrieval when there is a strong association between the cue (e.g., spaghetti) 
and the intended action (e.g., say “sauce”), such that processing the cue automatically 
activates the intended action; 2) A discrepancy-plus-search process may also produce 
spontaneous noticing when encountering a cue that produces discrepancy between the 
expected and actual quality (or speed) of processing, which may in turn stimulate search 
for the source of the (dis)fluency (McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004). In 
either case, it is suggested that reactive processes following cue processing stimulates 
retrieval of the intended action without the engagement of preparatory attention. 
Cognitive Control Processes in Prospective Memory 
 Despite the abundance of research that has fueled theoretical debates over the past 
two decades on when cognitive control processes are enacted during event-based PM 
(e.g., Einstein & McDaniel, 2010; Smith, 2010; Smith et al., 2007), relatively little is 
known about the nature of these control processes. One possible reason for the limited 
understanding of PM control processes is that the majority of extant research and 
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theorizing has focused primarily on a single aspect of cognitive control (i.e., working 
memory; but see Schnitzpahn et al., 2013). However, more recently the dual mechanisms 
of control (DMC) framework has been developed to explain attention control in various 
cognitive tasks that may also be applicable to the understanding of PM monitoring and 
retrieval processes (Braver, 2012; Bugg, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2013; Bugg, McDaniel, 
Scullin, & Braver, 2011). Thus, I briefly review these two aspects of cognitive control 
and their relation to PM. 
Working memory capacity. One of the most widely studied external correlates 
of PM is working memory capacity (WMC). Working memory is broadly defined as a 
general purpose system involved in both actively maintaining task-relevant information 
in primary memory in the face of internal or external distraction and controlled retrieval 
from secondary memory of momentarily displaced information (Baddeley, 2007; Engle 
& Kane, 2004; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Importantly, it has been suggested that the 
control processes enacted to maintain task-relevant information in various attention tasks 
may underlie the relation between WMC and PM.  In particular, it is suggested that 
control processes associated with working memory are enacted during PM tasks to 
actively maintain intention-relevant information and engage strategic monitoring 
processes to support cue detection (e.g., Einstein, Smith, McDaniel, & Shaw, 1997; 
Guynn, 2003; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Smith, 2003). For example, Brewer, Knight, Marsh 
and Unsworth (2010) found that nonfocal cue detection was better for high than low 
WMC participants, but did not differ between groups for focal cue detection. 
Interestingly, there were no nonfocal ongoing task processing cost differences between 
groups as might be expected if goal-maintenance abilities underlie cost that contributes to 
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PM retrieval. Brewer et al. suggested that similar RTs might reflect that participants 
allocated attention equally across groups, but low WMC participants were more 
susceptible to internal interference (e.g., task-unrelated thoughts; West et al., 2005) that 
disrupted nonfocal cue detection. However, an alternative explanation is that high and 
low WMC participants relied on different types of cognitive control processes that both 
produced cost to ongoing task performance, yet were differentially effective for cue 
detection. This idea is consistent with previous research that has suggested that WMC 
limitations might increase reliance on less efficacious control processes to support 
ongoing task processing in other domains.  
Dual mechanisms of control framework. The dual mechanisms of control 
(DMC) framework proposes that variation in working memory arises due to cognitive 
control processes that operate via two distinct modes, referred to as proactive and 
reactive control (Braver, 2012; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). Proactive control is 
involved in actively maintaining context information (e.g., task instructions, previous 
stimuli, cues, etc.) to optimally bias perception and action systems to facilitate goal-
directed behavior (Braver et al., 2007). Proactive control is a top-down, early-selection 
process that serves to anticipate and prevent interference by sustaining activation of goal-
relevant attentional states.  In contrast, reactive control occurs via transient activation of 
bottom-up, late-correction processes that serve to reduce interference after its onset. 
Importantly, although under many circumstances proactive control is the optimal 
processing mode to facilitate goal-completion, sustained activation of contextual 
information is prohibitively costly. Thus, during tasks that require high cognitive control 
demands (e.g., nonfocal PM tasks), adopting a particular processing mode is based on a 
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cost/benefit assessment of the ease with which actively maintaining context can be 
achieved and the expected gains that engaging such a control process will produce to 
ongoing task performance (Braver, 2012). Consequently, WMC may influence the 
reliance on proactive control as this ability reflects the efficacy with which context 
maintenance can be achieved (Kane & Engle, 2002).  
 Previous research suggests that low WMC participants are more likely to engage 
reactive control processes in the AX-continuous performance test (AX-CPT; MacDonald 
et al., 2005; Redick & Engle, 2011), a task commonly used to study proactive and 
reactive control. In this task, a ‘target’ response is required only when the probe X 
follows the cue A (AX trial), which occurs on the majority (70%) of the trials to produce 
expectancy. However, the cue A is followed by a probe other than X on 10% of the trials 
(AY trial), and the probe X follows a cue other than A on another 10% of the trials (BX 
trial). Additionally, on 10% of the trials neither an A or X are presented (BY trials). 
Importantly, on BX trials context information (the cue B) can be used to inhibit a 
dominant response tendency to make a target response when X is presented, whereas on 
AY trials context information (the cue A) serves to bias processing to subsequently 
(erroneously) make a target response. Thus, reliance on proactive control processes 
should facilitate performance on AX and BX trials, but can actually hurt performance on 
AY trials. Consistent with the idea that WMC may influence the reliance on proactive 
versus reactive control processes, low WMC participants are more likely to engage 
reactive control processes as evidenced by increased errors AX and BX trials, 
presumably due capacity limitations involved in actively maintaining context information 
(Redick & Engle, 2011).  
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 Interestingly, there is considerable overlap between the cognitive control 
processes proposed in the DMC framework and those thought to underlie PM retrieval as 
proposed by the multiprocess view (see Bugg et al., 2013 for a more detailed discussion). 
In particular, both proactive control and preparatory attention involve sustained activation 
of a mental task set that biases attention towards goal-relevant information, whereas both 
reactive control and spontaneous retrieval involve transient activation of goal-relevant 
information triggered by particular characteristics of the stimuli. Thus, while reactive 
control processes may be sufficient to automatically trigger retrieval of the intended 
action during focal processing conditions, reliance on reactive control may be detrimental 
to nonfocal processing conditions thereby providing an explanation for the reported 
differences in prospective memory cue detection across focal versus nonfocal tasks.  
Consequently, it is generally assumed that the optimal processing mode for nonfocal cue 
detection is proactive control. This is evidenced by studies demonstrating that cost only 
occurs upon encountering ongoing task contexts in which cues are expected to appear, 
suggesting that preparatory attention (i.e., proactive control) is not necessary during 
contexts in which participants know cues will not appear (Knight et al., 2011; Marsh, 
Hicks, & Cook, 2006). However, recent ex-Gaussian fits to RT distributions in this task 
challenge the assumption that proactive monitoring processes are enacted continuously 
throughout the ongoing task, suggesting instead that these processes may be enacted 
more transiently (Ball, Brewer, Loft, & Bowden, 2014). Thus, ex-Gaussian analyses may 
provide a means to estimate proactive and reactive control processes in the context of 
PM. 
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Response Time Distribution Analyses 
Analyzing RT distributions may help to better address these hypotheses regarding 
the regularity in which control processes are engaged to support cue detection. The ex-
Gaussian function is a convolution of the Gaussian and Exponential distributions. At each 
time point x, the ex-Gaussian distribution is described by the mean (mu) and variance 
(sigma) of the Gaussian distribution, and the mean (and standard deviation) of the 
Exponential distribution (tau).  
𝑓(𝑥|𝜇, 𝜎, 𝜏) =  
1
𝜏√2𝜋
exp (
𝜎2
2𝜏2
−  
𝑥 −  𝜇
𝜏
) . ∫ exp (− 
𝑦2
2
)  dy
[(
𝑥− 𝜇
𝜎 )− (
𝜎
𝜏)]
−∞
 
The sum of mu and tau produces the mean of the overall distribution, and the sum of their 
squared standard deviations (sigma
2
 + tau
2
) produces the variance. Important for 
understanding the relation between ex-Gaussian parameter estimates and mean RTs, the 
sum of mu and tau estimates is approximately equal to the mean RT because the sum of 
the true values of mu and tau is equal to the true mean of the ex-Gaussian distribution. 
Figure 1 illustrates that an increase in mu leads to a distributional shift to the right, 
whereas an increase in tau leads to a positive distributional skew (see Balota & Yap, 2011 
for more details on RT distribution analyses). 
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Figure 1. (a) Two hypothetical ex-Gaussian distributions with changes in mu only. (b) 
Two hypothetical ex-Gaussian distributions with changes in tau only. 
Although it is important to note that ex-Gaussian parameters do not reflect 
underlying cognitive process (Matzke & Wagenmakers, 2009), previous research has 
suggested that these parameters are more affected by some manipulations than others. For 
example, interference effects due to response competition during various attention control 
tasks have been associated primarily with an overall shift in the RT distribution (e.g., De 
Jong, Berendsen, & Cools, 1999; Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 2000; Unsworth, Spillers, 
Brewer, & McMillan, 2011), whereas goal neglect due to periodic lapses of attention has 
been associated primarily with a positive skew in the tail of the distribution (e.g., 
Schmiedek et al., 2007; Tse et al., 2010; Unsworth et al., 2011; Unsworth, Redick, 
Lakey, & Young, 2010). Importantly, these findings suggest that theorizing of the 
underlying cognitive control processes that contribute to PM cost may be improved by 
disentangling these components of the RT distribution rather than simply relying on mean 
RT measures.  
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Brewer (2011) and Ball et al. (2014) recently fit the ex-Gaussian function to RTs 
during a LDT with a nonfocal intention. Somewhat surprisingly, RT distributions 
provided little evidence that the observed cost from possessing an intention was due to 
PM control processes that were enacted continuously throughout the task, as would be 
indicated by an overall shift in the distribution (i.e., mu; but see Loft, Bowden, Ball, & 
Brewer, 2014). Instead, ex-Gaussian analyses revealed that that cost was due entirely to 
an increase in the relative frequency of slow responses (tau). Based on these findings, it 
was suggested that in contrast to the general supposition that monitoring processes are 
enacted fairly continuously on a trial-by-trial basis throughout the ongoing task (e.g., 
Guynn, 2003; Einstein & McDaniel, 2010; Smith, 2003), cost may reflect transient 
moments in which the intention is sporadically brought to mind throughout the task that 
produces slowing on the subset of trials in which the intention is active (DeWitt, Hicks, 
Ball, & Knight, 2012; Einstein, McDaniel, Willifod, Pagan, & Dismukes, 2003). It is 
possible that participants tried to engage strategic monitoring processes but ongoing task 
demands displaced the intention from focal awareness. Thus, increases in tau may reflect 
control processes involved in periodic reactivation of the intention from long-term 
memory. Alternatively, the intention may be automatically reactivated via associative 
cueing from the ongoing task context or stimuli that stimulates engagement of control 
processes needed for attending to and interpreting the contextually cued retrieved 
intention (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). In either case, periodic reactivation may serve 
keep the intention representation at an activation level that is sufficient to stimulate 
retrieval processes upon encountering PM cues. Importantly, these findings suggest that 
the monitoring processes underlying cost effects in PM may be more complex than has 
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been previously suggested. However, because only recently have ex-Gaussian analyses 
been implemented to better understand the cognitive control processes involved in PM, 
and only under a select set of conditions, more research is needed to determine whether 
various portions of the RT distribution are meaningfully associated with various 
cognitive control processes that may facilitate PM.  
CURRENT STUDIES 
 The results from ex-Gaussian analyses suggest that the monitoring processes 
underlying cost effects in PM may be more complex than has been previously suggested. 
However, because only recently have ex-Gaussian analyses been implemented to better 
understand the cognitive control processes involved in PM, and only under a select set of 
conditions, more research is needed to determine whether various portions of the RT 
distribution are meaningfully associated with various cognitive control processes that 
may facilitate PM. Furthermore, although the DMF framework dovetails nicely with 
current conceptualizations of PM, no studies to date have rigorously examined the role of 
proactive versus reactive control processes in the context of PM. Therefore, in Chapter 2 
I use individual differences techniques in conjunction with RT distribution modeling to 
assess the working memory and DMC framework accounts of PM and explore the role of 
these processes with ex-Gaussian parameter estimates and cue detection processes. 
Additionally, I assess the role of other cognitive control constructs (inhibition and 
vigilance) to examine whether additional mechanisms may contribute to PM 
performance. In Chapters 3 and 4, I more directly test the DMC framework in the context 
of PM by assessing the role of proactive and reactive control processes on monitoring and 
cue detection across multiple experimental paradigms. In Chapter 3, I use quasi-
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experimental techniques to determine whether proactive control processes are mutable in 
the context of PM by examining PM conditions that place more or less demands on 
executive attention processes. In Chapter 4, I use neuroscience techniques (event-related 
potentials) to investigate the neural correlates of cue detection under conditions that 
promote reliance on proactive versus reactive control processes. Together, these findings 
will serve to provide a more complete understanding of the cognitive control processes 
underlying PM performance and inform extant theories of PM monitoring and cue 
detection. 
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Chapter 2 
EXPERIMENT 1: OVERVIEW 
Considerable research has implicated working memory as an integral process 
underlying successful PM retrieval (Ball, Knight, DeWitt, Brewer, 2013; Breneiser & 
McDaniel, 2006; Brewer et al., 2010; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Smith & Bayen, 2005). 
However, PM is multifaceted and its success is likely determined by multiple cognitive 
processes acting in concert, or via different processes operating on different components 
of the PM task (i.e., intention formation, retention, initiation, and execution). Importantly, 
however, the majority of the extant PM research has either focused only on a single 
aspect of cognitive control (e.g., WMC; e.g., Breneiser & McDaniel, 2006) in PM or only 
assessed the role of multiple cognitive control processes in cue detection (e.g. Rose, 
Rendell, McDaniel, Aberle, & Kliegel, 2010; Schnitzpahn et al., 2013). Furthermore, the 
studies that have examined the influence of cognitive control on PM cost have only 
examined mean RTs (e.g., Brewer et al., 2010). Thus, to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the cognitive control processes underlying successful monitoring and 
cue detection, the current study implemented an individual differences approach to assess 
the relation between multiple cognitive control constructs, ex-Gaussian cost estimates, 
and cue detection. 
Cognitive Control Processes in Prospective Memory 
As described previously, WMC has been studied extensively in the context of PM 
(Ball et al., 2013; Brewer et al., 2010; Cherry & LeCompte, 1999; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; 
Reynolds, West, & Braver, 2009; Smith & Bayen, 2005; West, Bowry, & Kompinger, 
2006). However, variation in WMC can explain differences in various lower-order 
14 
 
cognitive processes, such as continuous performance task decrements (MacDonald et al., 
2005; Redick & Engle, 2011) flanker interference and anti-saccade performance (Heitz & 
Engle, 2007; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004), and psychomotor vigilance attentional 
lapses (Unsworth et al., 2010). Importantly, each of the aforementioned sets of tasks 
theoretically reflects different cognitive processes, and thus the exact mechanisms that 
contribute to the observed relation between WMC and PM are not entirely clear.  
As described in the Introduction, the relation between proactive control and PM is 
largely unexplored. However, there is some evidence to suggest that inhibitory processes 
may be related to PM cue detection. In particular, Schnitzpahn et al. (2013) examined 
individual differences in inhibition, task switching, and updating and found that only the 
former two uniquely predicted cue detection abilities. It was suggested that inhibitory 
processes were needed to inhibit the prepotent response tendency of making the ongoing 
task, and that task-switching processes were needed to shift from the ongoing to the PM 
task to execute the intended action. However, the role of inhibitory processes in ongoing 
task latencies is unclear because the authors did not assess RTs. In regard to vigilance, it 
is often suggested that PM monitoring may reflect the ability to sustain attention for long 
durations in order for cues to be detected (Brandimonte, Ferrante, Feresin, & Delbello, 
2001; Graf & Uttl, 2001; Smith, 2003). Consequently, vigilance should presumably play 
an important role in PM performance. Interestingly, however, research suggests that PM 
monitoring processes may actually be dissociated from those associated with vigilance 
(Brandimonte et al., 2001, 2001; Rose et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012). It is suggested that 
this dissociation may occur because PM tasks are considered dual-task in nature (ongoing 
task + PM task), whereas vigilance tasks are considered only a single-task (ongoing task; 
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Graf & Uttl, 2001). Nevertheless, lapses of attention during the ongoing task may 
contribute to periodic missing of cues and slowing of RTs. 
In regard to the current study, it was predicted that both WMC and proactive 
control would be associated with mu, as these processes underlie the ability to 
continuously maintain goal-relevant information (e.g., intention). However, because 
inhibition may only be needed for cue detection, and vigilance may merely reflect 
sustained attention to the ongoing task, these processes may not actually contribute to 
ongoing task latencies. In contrast, reactive control should be associated tau, as this 
process is associated with transient activation of stimulus-driven control that may serve to 
periodically reactive the intention during the ongoing task. If, however, tau merely 
reflects lapses of attention rather than processes associated with PM, then presumably 
vigilance should be associated with tau. In regard to cue detection, it is predicted that 
performance should be better for individuals more likely to engage continuous 
monitoring strategies, as this is more efficacious for nonfocal cue detection than is 
transient monitoring processes. Thus, cue detection should be greater for those with high 
in WM and proactive control. Furthermore, inhibition and vigilance should be associated 
with cue detection, as the prepotent response tendencies must be inhibited in service of 
making a PM response and sustained attention is needed to maintain focus throughout the 
duration of the task.  
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METHOD 
Participants  
One hundred and seventy two Arizona State University undergraduate students 
enrolled in an introductory psychology course participated in the study.  Students 
received course credit for their participation in the study. Participants completed two 
working memory tasks (operation and reading span), two proactive control tasks (verbal 
and spatial AX-CPT), two inhibition tasks (antisaccade and flanker), two vigilance tasks 
(psychomotor vigilance and degraded mask), and two nonfocal PM task (animal and 
‘TOR’). 
Working Memory Tasks. 
 Operation span (Ospan).  Participants solved a series of math operations while 
trying to remember a set of unrelated letters (F, H, J, K, L, N, P, Q, R, S, T, Y).  
Participants were required to solve a math operation and judge whether their answer 
matched either a correct or incorrect alternative (e.g. (1*2) + 1 = 3?”).  After solving the 
operation and making their judgment, they were presented with a letter for 1 s.  
Participants were given feedback about the accuracy of their math operations and they 
had to maintain their performance level above 85%. Immediately after the letter was 
presented the next operation was presented.  Three trials of each letter list-length (3-7) 
were presented, with the order of list-length varying randomly.  At recall, letters from the 
current set were attempted to be recalled in the correct order by clicking on the 
appropriate letters (see Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).  Participants received 
three sets (of list-length two) of practice.  For all of the span measures, items were scored 
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if the item was correct in the correct position.  The score was the proportion of correct 
items recalled in the correct position. 
 Reading span (Rspan).  Participants were required to read sentences while trying 
to remember the same set of unrelated letters as in the operation span task.  For this task, 
participants read a sentence and determined whether the sentence made sense or not (e.g. 
“The prosecutor’s dish was lost because it was not based on fact. ?”).  Half of the 
sentences made sense while the other half did not.  Nonsense sentences were made by 
simply changing one word (e.g. “dish” from “case”) from an otherwise normal sentence.  
Participants were required to read the sentence and to indicate whether it made sense or 
not.  After participants gave their response they were presented with a letter for 1 s.  At 
recall, letters from the current set were asked to be recalled in the correct order by 
clicking on the appropriate letters.  There were three trials of each list-length with list-
length ranging from 3–7.  Participants received practice on all components of the reading 
span task before beginning.  The same scoring procedure as operation span was used. 
Proactive Control Tasks 
Verbal continuous performance task (PCverb). The PCverb used in the current 
study was based on Redick and Engle (2011) as described previously. Participants used 
their right hand to make target responses to the letter X when it followed an A (probes on 
AX trials) with the right index finger and to make nontarget responses to all other stimuli 
that appeared (all cues and probes on AY, BX, and BY trials) with their left index finger. 
Letters were presented for 500 ms each, and participants had up to 1,000 ms from the 
onset of each letter to respond. Cues and probes were randomly determined for each 
nontarget. The cue–probe and intertrial intervals each lasted 1,000 ms. Participants 
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completed practice blocks until they had achieved a mean probe accuracy of 75% before 
proceeding to the experimental blocks. There were a total of four experimental blocks, 
with a brief resting period in between each block. Within each block there were 40 cue-
probe trials, with 28 AX trials (70%), 4 BX trials (10%), 4 AY trials (10%), and 4 BY 
trials (10%). Proactive control scores were calculated by computing the difference 
between proportional AX trial hits and BX trial false alarms. This measure was chosen as 
the dependent variable because previous research has suggested that working memory 
differences primarily arise for BX (and to a lesser degree, AX) trials (MacDonald et al, 
2005; Redick & Engle, 2011). 
Spatial continuous performance task (PCspat). The procedure for the PCspat was 
identical to the PCverb. The only difference between the two tasks was that dots patterns in 
various spatial arrangements were used as cues and probes rather letters (see MacDonald 
et al., 2005 for more details). Valid cue and probe trials are displayed in Figure 2, along 
with several examples of invalid cue and probe trials. Target responses were required 
only when the valid probe was presented following the valid cue, which occurred on the 
majority of the trials (70%). Other than the stimuli being dot patterns, the procedure was 
identical to the PCverb. Proactive control scores were calculated by computing the 
difference between proportional AX trial hits and BX trial false alarms. 
 
Figure 2. Examples of valid and invalid cue and probe trials during the spatial 
continuous performance task. 
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Inhibition Tasks 
 Antisaccade. Participants were instructed to stare at a fixation point onscreen for 
a variable amount of time (200-2200ms).  A flashing white “=” was then flashed either to 
the left or right of fixation (11.33° of visual angle) for 100ms. This cue was followed by 
the target stimulus (a B, P, or R) onscreen for 100ms. The target was followed by 
masking stimuli (an H for 50ms and an 8 which remains onscreen until a response is 
given).  The participants’ task was to identify the target letter by pressing a key for B, P, 
or R (the keys 1, 2, or 3).  The target always appeared in the opposite location as the 
flashing cue. The dependent variable was the proportion of correct key presses. 
 Flanker. Participants were presented with a fixation point for 400ms followed by 
an arrow directly above the fixation point for 1700ms.  Participants indicated the 
direction the arrow was pointing (pressing the F for left pointing arrows or pressing J for 
right pointing arrows) as quickly and accurately as possible.  On 50 neutral trials the 
arrow was flanked by two horizontal lines on each side.  On 50 congruent trials the arrow 
was flanked by two arrows pointing in the same direction as the target arrow on each 
side.  On 50 incongruent trials the target arrow was flanked by two arrows pointing in the 
opposite direction as the target arrow on each side.  All trial types were randomly 
intermixed.  The dependent variable was the reaction time difference between 
incongruent and congruent trials. 
Vigilance Tasks 
 Psychomotor Vigilance Task (PVT). Participants were presented with a row of 
zeros on screen and after a variable amount of time the zeros began to count up in 1ms 
intervals from 0ms. The participants’ task was to press the spacebar as quickly as 
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possible once the numbers started counting up (roughly 75 total trials).  After pressing the 
spacebar the response-time was left on screen for 1s to provide feedback to the 
participants.  Interstimulus intervals were randomly distributed and ranged from 1 to 10s. 
The dependent variable is the number of lapses of attention (computed as RTs greater 
than 500 ms) throughout the task (Unsworth et al., 2010). 
 Degraded Mask (DGM). Participants were presented a series of degraded stimuli 
rapidly on a proactive control screen. A random sequence of centrally located digits, 
ranging from 0 to 9, were presented in monochrome. The digit “0” was designated as the 
target (probability = 0.25), whereas the letter “D” was the nontarget. Stimuli were 
presented at an even rate of one per second. Participants responded to the target and 
nontarget stimuli by pressing the “F” or “J” key, respectively, Instructions emphasized 
both response speed and accuracy. Task performance within each condition lasted for 10 
minutes. The dependent variable was overall accuracy during the task. 
Prospective Memory Tasks 
 Animacy Judgment Task (AJT). For the animacy judgment task (AJT), 
participants decided on each trial whether the presented word was living (e.g., fish) or not 
living (e.g., table). During the practice, control (prior to intention formation), and 
experimental (following intention formation) blocks there were 30, 70, and 210 trials, 
respectively, half of which were living and half of which were non-living. The 310 
separate words were chosen from the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms. All of these 
stimuli were randomly assigned to a trial position within the experimental sequence for 
each participant tested. After this randomization, the software randomly assigned eight 
prospective memory cues to trials 25, 50, 75, etc. through trial 200. Each of the cues 
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contained the syllable “tor” (e.g., doctor) and were chosen from the MRC database 
(Coltheart, 1981).  
Participants read instructions for the experiment from the computer monitor. 
Ongoing task instructions for the practice, control, and experimental blocks informed 
participants that they were to respond (using the F and J keys) according to whether or 
not the word on a trial was living or not living. After each decision was made, a waiting 
message would appear to indicate to the participants to press the spacebar to continue to 
the next trial. After receiving instructions for the AJT, participants performed a 30 trial 
practice block followed immediately by a 70 trial control block. Following completion of 
the control block, participants were informed that in a few minutes they would AJT 
again. Additionally, they were instructed that if at any point during the AJT they 
encounter a word containing the syllable “tor”, they should make their animacy judgment 
per usual but then press the “/” during the waiting message instead of pressing the 
spacebar. After participants acknowledged that they understood the task instructions, they 
performed a 10-minute antisaccade task prior to beginning the experimental block so that 
the intention was not fully active when the experimental AJT was administered.  
Following completion of the 210 trial experiment AJT block participants were queried for 
their memory of the PM instructions. Participants that were unable to describe the nature 
of PM intention were excluded from all analyses, as this reflects a retrospective memory 
error rather than a PM error. Dependent variables included the proportion of cues 
detected, mean RT cost (experimental RT – control RT), mu cost (experimental mu – 
control mu), and tau cost (experimental tau – control tau). Derivation of ex-Gaussian 
parameter estimates are described below.  
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 Syllable Judgment Task (SJT). The procedure for the SJT with an “animal” 
intention (e.g., horse) was nearly identical to the AJT. For the SJT task, participants 
decided on each trial whether the presented words contained one (e.g., hat) or two (e.g., 
peanut) syllables. For the practice, control, and experimental blocks, 310 words (not used 
in the AJT) were chosen from the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms. Following 
completion of the control block, participants were informed that they would later again 
perform the SJT and that if at any point during the subsequent SJT they encounter a word 
that denoted an animal (e.g., horse), they should make their syllable judgment per usual 
but then press the “/” during the waiting message instead of pressing the spacebar. After 
participants acknowledged that they understood the task instructions, they performed a 
10-minute flanker task (described above) prior to beginning the experimental block so 
that the intention was not fully active when the experimental SJT was administered.  
Following completion of the 210 trial experimental SJT participants were queried for 
their memory of the PM instructions. Participants that were unable to describe the nature 
of PM intention were excluded from all analyses. The dependent variables included the 
proportion of cues detected, mean RT cost (experimental RT – control RT), mu cost 
(experimental mu – control mu), and tau cost (experimental tau – control tau). Derivation 
of ex-Gaussian parameter estimates are described below.  
Response time analyses. Only correct (non-cue) trials within 2.5 standard 
deviations of each participant’s mean were included for the analyses. I also excluded the 
two trials following cue presentation in the experimental blocks because participants may 
have been still been engaging cue-related processes during these trials (e.g., Meier & 
Rey-Mermet, 2012). RTs were analyzed by calculating mean RTs during the ongoing 
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task for each participant, separately for control and experimental blocks for both PM 
tasks. Ex-Gaussian analyses were performed on the same RTs using Quantile Maximum 
Probability Estimation (QMPE) software (Heathcote, Brown, & Cousineau, 2004) to 
obtain parameters estimates for each participant that best produced the observed data. 
Estimates of mu, sigma, & tau were derived separately for control and experimental 
blocks for each participant using the maximum possible number of quantiles (N-1). 
Acceptable model fits were obtained within 30 iterations for all participants. 
RESULTS 
Cognitive Control and Prospective Memory Measures 
Descriptive statistics for each of the measures can be found in Table 1. 
Correlations between the each of the cognitive control measures, cue detection measures, 
and RT cost measures can be found in Table 2. As can be seen, performance across all 
measures within a construct was positively correlated, and generally correlations within a 
construct are more strongly correlated than measures across constructs. Given the 
positive correlations of measures within a construct, principal component analyses were 
separately performed on the two measures for each construct. 
Table 1.  
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Descriptive Statistics for all Cognitive Control and Prospective Memory Tasks
 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; proactive control = proactive control; INH = 
inhibition; VIG = vigilance; PM = prospective memory; IT = task interference (mean RT 
cost); MU = mu cost; TAU = tau cost. 
a 
INHFLK and VIGPVT were reverse scored such 
that higher values reflect more efficient processing. 
 
Table 2.  
Correlations between Cognitive Control and Prospective Memory Tasks 
 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; proactive control = proactive control; INH = 
inhibition; VIG = vigilance; PM = prospective memory; IT = task interference (mean RT 
cost); MU = mu cost; TAU = tau cost.  
 
Individual Differences in Prospective Memory Performance  
Correlations between the individual differences constructs, overall cue detection, 
and RT cost measures of interest can be found in Table 3.  As can be seen, all cognitive 
Mean SE Mean Min Max Skew Kurtosis
WMCOS 59.31 1.01 10.00 75.00 -1.42 2.08
WMCRS 54.54 .80 21.00 74.00 -.58 .35
PCVERB 2.60 .08 -.05 4.69 .10 -.43
PCSPAT 2.56 .08 -1.03 4.69 -.35 .40
INHANTI .65 .01 .32 .95 -.16 -.80
a
INHFLK -77.66 3.24 -17.94 220.73 .76 1.01
a
VIGPVT -11.66 .72 -45.00 0.00 -1.03 .67
VIGDGM .63 .01 .10 .98 -.58 -.16
PMSJT .56 .02 0.00 1.00 -.54 -.85
PMAJT .66 .02 0.00 1.14 -.81 -.06
ITSJT -3.01 8.45 -383.58 224.36 -.48 .48
ITAJT 236.57 10.83 -168.36 688.62 .54 .90
MUSJT -.50 4.83 -237.53 157.24 -.30 .75
MUAJT 84.25 5.31 -62.86 304.95 .83 1.00
TAUSJT -3.94 7.16 -345.47 207.07 -.68 1.51
TAUAJT 151.54 8.85 -220.37 512.03 .36 1.47
WMCOS WMCRS PCVERB PCSPAT INHANTI INHFLK VIGPVT VIGDGM PMSJT PMAJT ITSJT ITAJT MUSJT MUAJT TAUSJT TAUAJT
WMCOS 1.00
WMCRS .52** 1.00
PCVERB .31** .17* 1.00
PCSPAT .27** .09 .59** 1.00
INHANTI .29** .28** .32** .36** 1.00
INHFLK .11 .14 .08 .14 .25** 1.00
VIGPVT .18* .05 .41** .60** .44** .18* 1.00
VIGDGM .12 -.03 .30** .47** .30** .13 .47** 1.00
PMSJT .25** .24** .20* .23** .23** .19* .22** .08 1.00
PMAJT .27** .18* .24** .17* .18* .13 .12 .22** .32** 1.00
ITSJT .19* .21** .15* .12 .19* .10 .07 .03 .29** .05 1.00
ITAJT .04 .09 .05 -.02 .13 .02 -.03 .13 .18* .27** .32** 1.00
MUSJT .15* .14 .22** .08 .13 .18* .13 .03 .26** .10 .56** .25** 1.00
MUAJT .19* .18* .22** .17* .18* .12 .12 .07 .17* .37** .26** .58** .22** 1.00
TAUSJT .12 .17* .04 .09 .13 .00 -.01 .01 .18* .00 .82** .21** -.02 .16* 1.00
TAUAJT -.07 .00 -.07 -.13 .05 -.05 -.12 .11 .12 .11 .22** .87** .17* .11 .15* 1.00
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control constructs were positively correlated with cue detection and not correlated with 
tau. In contrast, only certain cognitive control constructs were positively correlated with 
mean RT and mu cost. Thus, I performed a series of regression analyses to understand the 
unique role of these various cognitive control processes in PM monitoring and cue 
detection.  
Table 3.  
Correlations between Cognitive Control and Prospective Memory Constructs 
  
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; proactive control = proactive control; INH = 
inhibition; VIG = vigilance; PM = prospective memory; IT = task interference (mean RT 
cost); MU = mu cost; TAU = tau cost. 
 
Cue Detection. The relation between the cognitive control constructs and cue 
detection was examined first. As mentioned previously, all constructs were positively 
correlated with cue detection (Table 3). However, a simultaneous regression analysis of 
PM performance on the cognitive control constructs (R
2
 = .179, F(4,164) = 8.94, p < 
.001) revealed that only WMC uniquely predicted cue detection (Table 4). Thus, 
individuals with higher WMC detected more PM cues after controlling for other variables 
in the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WMC PC INH VIG PM IT MU TAU
WMC 1.00
PC .27
** 1.00
INH .30
**
.32
** 1.00
VIG .11 .58
**
.39
** 1.00
PM .33
**
.29
**
.29
**
.23
** 1.00
IT .19
* .11 .17
* .07 .30
** 1.00
MU .24
**
.25
**
.25
** .13 .35
**
.65
** 1.00
TAU .08 -.03 .05 .00 .17
*
.86
**
.18
* 1.00
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Table 4.  
Regression of Cue Detection on Cognitive Control Constructs 
 
 
Mean RT cost. Next, the relation between the cognitive control constructs and 
mean RT cost was examined. As can be seen in Table 3, only WMC and inhibition were 
positively correlated with mean RT cost. However, a simultaneous regression analysis of 
mean RT cost on the cognitive control constructs (R
2
 = .05, F(4,164) = 2.16, p = .076) 
revealed that none of the cognitive control constructs uniquely predicted cost (Table 5). 
Thus, the various cognitive control constructs did not account for a significant proportion 
of variance in mean RT cost, and none of the constructs were uniquely predictive of cost. 
Table 5.  
Regression of Mean Reaction Time Cost on Cognitive Control Constructs 
 
Mu cost. Next, the relation between the cognitive control constructs and mu cost 
was examined. As can be seen in Table 3, WMC, proactive control, and inhibition were 
all positively correlated with mu cost. However, a simultaneous regression analysis of mu 
cost on the cognitive control constructs (R
2
 = .116, F(4,164) = 5.38, p < .001) revealed 
only proactive control and inhibition uniquely predicted cost (Table 6). Thus, individuals 
higher in proactive control and inhibition, were more likely to exhibit greater mu cost 
after accounting for other variables in the model. 
IV B SE(B) β t p
WMC .248 .08 .248 3.25 .001
PC .134 .09 .134 1.49 .138
INH .146 .08 .146 1.82 .071
VIG .069 .09 .069 .76 .450
IV B SE(B) β t p
WMC .143 .08 .143 1.75 .082
PC .036 .10 .036 .37 .711
INH .119 .09 .119 1.39 .167
VIG -.012 .10 -.012 -.12 .903
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Table 6.  
Regression of Mu Cost on Cognitive Control Constructs 
 
Tau cost. I next examined the relationship between the cognitive control 
constructs and tau cost. As can be seen in Table 3, none of the cognitive control 
constructs were associated with tau. Accordingly, a simultaneous regression analysis of 
tau cost on the cognitive control constructs (R
2
 = .012, F < 1) revealed that none of the 
cognitive control constructs uniquely predicted cost (Table 7). Thus, the various 
cognitive control constructs did not account for a significant proportion of variance in tau 
cost, and none of the constructs were uniquely predictive of cost. 
Table 7.  
Regression of Tau Cost on Cognitive Control Constructs 
 
Supplemental Analyses 
 Somewhat surprisingly, there was no evidence of cost during the syllable 
judgment PM task (see Table 1). Thus, although the correlations between PM measures 
across both PM tasks were positive, it is possible that the previous results are masking 
task specific effects. Therefore, I reran the regression analyses separately for each PM 
task. Importantly, correlations between the composite cognitive control constructs and 
PM measures were similar across both tasks (as is somewhat apparent in Table 2), 
IV B SE(B) β t p
WMC .148 .08 .148 1.87 .064
PC .185 .09 .185 1.98 .049
INH .168 .08 .168 2.02 .045
VIG -.054 .09 -.054 -.57 .570
IV B SE(B) β t p
WMC .088 .08 .088 1.06 .293
PC -.072 .10 -.072 -.73 .465
INH .045 .09 .045 .51 .609
VIG .015 .10 .015 .15 .880
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although slightly attenuated relative to the composite PM measures. Furthermore, the 
regression analyses run separately for each task were similar to the composite analyses. 
In particular, WMC was predictive of cue detection across both tasks. Furthermore, 
proactive control and inhibition were positively associated with mu across both tasks 
(although these effects were only marginal). The primary difference across the two tasks 
was that in the SJT, but not the AJT, inhibition was additionally predictive of cue 
detection and WMC was predictive of mean RT cost, which likely contributed to the 
marginal effects seen in the composite analyses for these variables. Nevertheless, these 
findings suggest that although there was no cost in the SJT, those that exhibited greater 
cost (in mean RT and mu) also tended to demonstrate more cost in the AJT. Furthermore, 
the cognitive control processes that contributed to cue detection and cost were similarly 
implemented across tasks. 
DISCUSSION 
The majority of extant research has concerned elucidating the cognitive control 
processes involved in cue detection, primarily investigating the role of working memory 
in successful noticing of the cue and retrieval of the intended action (Ball et al., 2013; 
Breneiser & McDaniel, 2006; Smith & Bayen, 2005, 2006). However, PM is multifaceted 
and likely relies on numerous control processes, not only for successfully detecting cues, 
but also maintenance of the intention and ongoing task instructions, target checking, and 
coordinating between the ongoing and PM task – all of which likely produce cost to 
ongoing task performance. Thus, the current study sought to examine the role of multiple 
cognitive control processes in both monitoring and cue detection using ex-Gaussian 
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analyses to provide a more nuanced understanding of the regularity in which these 
control processes were enacted.  
Consistent with previous research, WMC was positively correlated with proactive 
control (Redick et al., 2011), inhibition (Unsworth et al., 2011), and vigilance (Unsworth 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, each of these constructs was positively correlated with cue 
detection. Interestingly, however, only WMC uniquely predicted variation in cue 
detection. Although a positive relationship between WMC and PM is not particularly 
surprising (e.g., Brewer et al., 2010), this finding is inconsistent with previous studies 
demonstrating that inhibition is predictive of cue detection after controlling for individual 
differences in WMC (e.g., Kliegel et al., 2000; Schnitzspahn et al., 2013). Notably, in the 
study by Schnitzpahn et al. participants were instructed to make their PM response 
instead of the ongoing task response, whereas participants in the current study first made 
their ongoing task response followed by their PM response during the waiting message. 
Although in the current study one must still inhibit the dominant response during the 
waiting message (i.e., spacebar) and remember to make a PM response, inhibition may be 
relatively less important in actual cue detection with the given of procedure (see 
Bisiacchi, Schiff, Ciccola, & Kliegel,  2009). In any manner, it likely the case that the 
unique relationship found between WMC and cue detection may reflect long-term 
memory processes associated with remembering the intention or processes associated 
with task switching. That is, individuals with higher WMC may be better able to 
remember the contents of the intention after a delay (Ball et al., 2013) or switch from the 
ongoing task to the PM task to engage in execution of the intended action (Brom & 
Kliegel, 2014; Schnitzpahn et al., 2013). Future work is needed to investigate this further. 
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In regard to monitoring, it was found that both proactive control and inhibition 
uniquely predicted variation in mu cost. Proactive control is often studied in tasks that 
produce response conflict (e.g., Simon or Stroop task; Blais, Harris, Guerrero, & Bunge, 
2012; Bugg et al., 2011) that requires inhibition of automatic response tendencies (e.g., 
word reading in Stroop task). In this regard, it is not necessarily surprising that both 
proactive control and inhibition were related to mu cost. However, the fact that both 
constructs uniquely predicted cost suggests that there may be two distinct processes 
associated with monitoring costs. Presumably, proactive control reflects continuous 
maintenance of a prospective retrieval mode that serves to treat incoming stimuli as 
potential cues (Guynn, 2003), whereas inhibition reflects processes associated with 
inhibiting the prepotent ongoing task response in order to engage target checking 
processes. Importantly, both of these processes should reduce the possibility of 
accidentally missing cues by producing slowing on all trials to engage appropriate target 
checks.  
Somewhat surprisingly, none of the cognitive control constructs were predictive 
of tau cost. Given that vigilance is associated with sustained attention across long 
durations (Graf & Uttl, 2001), it was expected that vigilance may be negatively 
associated with tau (Unsworth et al., 2010). This finding, in conjunction with the fact the 
tau was positively correlated with cue detection, suggests that increases in tau may not 
reflect lapses of attention. However, it was also predicted that proactive control would be 
negatively correlated with tau cost, as reactive control processes involve reducing 
interference following stimulus onset (Braver, 2012). Thus, certain stimuli (e.g., words 
containing the phoneme “OR”) may produce fluency/discrepancy that may stimulate 
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reactive target checks that produce slowing on a subset of trials. However, there was no 
relationship found between reactive control and tau. The exact reasoning behind the null 
relationship between tau cost and the various cognitive control constructs is not entirely 
clear. However, it is likely the case that the RTs in the tail of the distribution reflect a 
combination of both PM-specific and PM-independent processes, which may explain the 
relatively small correlation (r = .15) between tau across both PM tasks. That is, the 
positive correlation between tau cost and PM suggests that slower RTs may reflect PM 
related process (e.g., target checking) that benefits cue detection, but lapses of the entire 
task set (i.e., ongoing task + PM task) may also produce slowing in the tail of the 
distribution that actually hampers cue detection.  
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Chapter 3 
EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B: OVERVIEW 
 The DMC framework posits that various situational and individual differences 
factors produce biases in reliance on proactive and reactive control processing modes in 
various cognitive control tasks (Braver, 2012). Importantly, these same factors likely 
influence reliance on various processing strategies in the context of PM. However, 
because no previous studies have investigated the relation between proactive control 
abilities and PM performance, it is not entirely clear under what conditions proactive 
versus reactive control strategies may serve to optimize PM performance. Furthermore, it 
is not clear whether proactive control strategies are mutable in the context of PM tasks, or 
if capacity limitations (or other important factors) prevent engagement of strategic 
monitoring processes in those low in proactive control abilities. Thus, the purpose of 
current set of studies is to extend the results of Experiment 1 by comparing PM 
performance between high and low proactive control participants on tasks that do or do 
not encourage reliance on strategic monitoring processes.  
EXPERIMENT 2A 
 The findings from Experiment 1 suggest that proactive control may be an 
important predictor of whether or not participants engage continuous monitoring 
processes to support PM retrieval. Thus, in Experiment 2A I sought to examine whether 
encoding instructions could increase reliance on more efficacious monitoring strategies in 
low proactive control participants. Previous research has demonstrated that emphasizing 
the importance of the PM intention facilitates subsequent cue detection relative to 
standard encoding instructions under conditions that require strategic monitoring 
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processes (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001, 2004). However, this comes at a 
cost to ongoing task processing (i.e., slower responding). These findings suggest that 
importance may increase reliance on more continuous monitoring processes. 
Consequently, importance instructions may serve to increase cue detection for low 
proactive control participants, presumably via reliance on more continuous monitoring 
processes. However, if high proactive control participants are already engaging 
continuous monitoring processes, importance instructions should have little influence on 
cue detection or cost measures. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Two hundred and seventy Arizona State University undergraduate students 
enrolled in an introductory psychology course participated in the study.  Students 
received course credit for their participation in the study. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the standard (N = 131) or importance (N = 139) PM encoding conditions.  All 
participants completed two proactive control tasks (verbal and spatial AX-CPT) and 
either version of the nonfocal PM task.  
Materials and Procedure 
All participants first performed the PM task (standard or importance), followed by 
the verbal and spatial proactive control tasks. 
Proactive control tasks. The materials and procedure for the proactive control 
tasks (verbal and spatial AX-CPT) were identical to Experiment 1. 
Prospective memory task. The materials and procedure for the PM task were 
identical to the animacy judgment PM task (‘TOR’ intention) used in Experiment 1, 
34 
 
except that between the control and experimental blocks participants instead performed a 
brief (1-2 minute) questionnaire as a distractor task. The only difference between the two 
PM conditions was that following the standard PM instructions, participants in the 
importance condition were additionally instructed that performance on the PM task (i.e., 
detecting cues) was more important than doing well on the ongoing task performance 
(Kliegel et al., 2001). 
Response time analyses. RT analyses were identical to those of Experiment 1. 
RTs were analyzed by calculating mean RTs during the ongoing task for each participant, 
separately for the control and experimental nonfocal PM.  
RESULTS 
Proactive Control 
Performance on the two continuous performance tasks was positively correlated 
in both the standard (r = .604, p < .001) and importance (r = .576, p < .001) conditions. 
Thus, a principal component analysis was separately run for each condition on the two 
proactive control tasks to form composite scores for the proactive control construct.  
Individual Differences in Prospective Memory 
For the subsequent analyses, PM variables of interest were separately submitted to 
a univariate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with condition (standard vs. importance) 
as a between-subjects variable and proactive control ability entered as a covariate. All 
analyses were conducted on the entire set of participants. However, in the case of any 
significant interactions with proactive control ability, subsequent analyses were 
conducted on a subset of participants that fell in the upper (high) and lower (low) 25% of 
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the proactive control ability distribution for each condition (for visual purposes, these 
data are plotted for each analyses conducted). 
 Cue detection. The analysis of mean cue detection (Figure 3) revealed an effect 
condition, F(1,266) = 12.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .046, with better performance in the 
importance (M = .81, SE = .02) than standard (M = .72, SE = .02) condition. There was 
also an effect of proactive control ability, F(1,266) = 16.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, with 
better performance for those with higher proactive control abilities. However, the 
interaction of condition and proactive control ability was not significant, F(1,266) = 1.15, 
p = .286, ηp2 = .004. 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of cues detected in Experiment 2A as a function of condition and 
proactive control ability. 
 
Mean RT cost. The analysis of mean RT (Figure 4) cost failed to reveal any 
significant effects, F’s < 2.52, p’s > .113. 
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Figure 4. Mean reaction time cost in Experiment 2A as a function of condition and 
proactive control ability. 
 
Mu Cost. The analysis of mean mu cost (Figure 5) revealed an effect condition, 
F(1,266) = 12.19, p = .001, ηp2 = .044, with higher mu in the importance (M = 79, SE = 
.02) than standard (M = 46, SE = .02) condition. However, there was no effect of 
proactive control ability and no interaction of condition and proactive control ability, F’s 
< 1.5, p’s > .259. 
 
Figure 5. Mean mu cost in Experiment 2A as a function of condition and proactive 
control ability. 
 
Tau Cost. The analysis of mean tau cost (Figure 6) revealed no effect of 
condition and no effect of proactive control ability, F’s < 2.41, p’s > .123. However, 
there was a marginal interaction of condition and proactive control ability, F(1,266) = 
3.38, p = .067, ηp2 = .013. This interaction primarily reflects that while there were no tau 
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differences between low and high proactive control participants in the importance 
condition, F < 1, low proactive control participants exhibited more tau cost than high 
proactive control participants in the standard condition, F(1,64) = 4.82, p = .032, ηp2 = 
.07. 
 
Figure 6. Mean tau cost in Experiment 2A as a function of condition and proactive 
control ability. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results from Experiment 2A are consistent with previous research 
demonstrating that importance instructions increase cue detection (Kliegel et al., 2001, 
2004). Somewhat surprisingly, however, the increase in cue detection as a result of 
importance instructions did not come at a cost to mean RTs during the experimental 
block. However, ex-Gaussian analyses showed that importance instructions actually 
served to increase mu (but not tau) cost relative to standard encoding instructions. 
Interestingly, while mu cost was positively correlated with cue detection (r = .302, p < 
.001), tau cost was not (r = .014, p = .815). Together with the finding that importance 
instructions eliminated the differences in tau between low and high proactive control 
participants, these findings suggest that importance instructions may serve to increase 
reliance on more continuous monitoring processes that serves to optimize cue detection. 
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These findings also highlight the importance of implementing ex-Gaussian analyses in 
the context of PM tasks.  
EXPERIMENT 2B 
Experiments 1 and 2A demonstrated that proactive control processes may be 
important in engaging continuous monitoring processes that contributes to cue detection. 
However, reliance on continuous monitoring processes may not always be efficacious, 
particularly under conditions that do not require costly monitoring processes. Thus, 
Experiment 2B sought to examine to role of proactive control abilities on cue detection 
and cost during focal and nonfocal processing conditions. Importantly, previous research 
has demonstrated that during focal processing conditions cue detection can occur without 
the engagement of costly cognitive control processes (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). That 
is, high levels of cue detection can occur without cost to ongoing task performance due to 
spontaneous retrieval processes. Thus, presumably there should be no differences in cue 
detection between high and low proactive control participants during focal processing 
conditions. However, if high proactive control participants are unable to regulate their 
monitoring strategies and continue to engage continuous monitoring processes, these 
individuals may be more likely to exhibit mu cost despite that fact that strategic 
monitoring is unnecessary.  
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METHOD 
Participants 
One hundred and sixty seven Arizona State University undergraduate students 
enrolled in an introductory psychology course participated in the study.  Students 
received course credit for their participation in the study. All participants completed two 
proactive control tasks (verbal and spatial AX-CPT), one nonfocal PM task, and one 
focal PM task.  
Materials and Procedure 
All participants first performed the practice and control phase of the PM task, 
followed by the two experimental blocks of the PM tasks (the order of which were 
counterbalanced across participants), followed by the verbal and spatial proactive control 
tasks. For example, a participant would perform the tasks in the following order: PM 
practice phase, PM control block, questionnaire 1, nonfocal PM experimental block, 
questionnaire 2, focal PM experimental block, verbal AX-CPT, spatial AX-CPT. Upon 
completion of the first experimental PM block, participants were given instructions for 
the new PM task and told that the previous intention was no longer important.  
Proactive control tasks. The materials and procedure for the proactive control 
tasks (verbal and spatial AX-CPT) were identical to Experiment 2A. 
Prospective memory practice and control blocks. The materials and procedure 
for the practice phase and control block of the PM were identical to those used in the 
standard condition of Experiment 2A.   
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Nonfocal prospective memory (experimental block). The materials and 
procedure for the experimental block of the nonfocal PM task were identical to the 
standard condition of Experiment 2A.   
Focal prospective memory (experimental block). The materials and procedure 
were nearly identical to that of the nonfocal condition, except instead of the “TOR” 
intention participants were instructed to press the “/” key any time the words “packet” or 
“dancer” appeared during the focal experimental block. For the experimental block, 210 
words (not used in the practice, control, or experimental nonfocal blocks) were chosen 
from the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms. 
Response time analyses. RT analyses were identical to those of Experiment 2A. 
RTs were analyzed by calculating mean RTs during the ongoing task for each participant, 
separately for the control, experimental nonfocal PM, and experimental focal PM blocks 
of the PM task.  
RESULTS 
Proactive Control 
Performance on the two continuous performance tasks was positively correlated (r 
= .630, p < .001). Thus, a principal component analysis was performed on the two 
proactive control tasks to form composite scores for the proactive control construct.  
Individual Differences in Prospective Memory 
 For the subsequent analyses, PM variables of interest were separately submitted to 
a repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with PM task (nonfocal vs. 
focal) as a within-subjects variable and proactive control ability entered as a covariate. 
All analyses were conducted on the entire set of participants. However, in the case of any 
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significant interactions with proactive control ability, subsequent analyses were 
conducted on a subset of participants that fell in the upper (high) and lower (low) 25% of 
the proactive control ability distribution for each condition (for visual purposes, these 
data are plotted for each analyses conducted). 
 Cue detection. The analysis of mean cue detection (Figure 7) revealed an effect 
of PM task, F(1,165) = 67.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .290, with better performance in the focal 
(M = .77, SE = .02) than nonfocal (M = .92, SE = .01) condition. There was also an effect 
of proactive control ability, F(1,165) = 7.78, p = .006, ηp2 = .045, with better performance 
for those with higher proactive control abilities. However, the interaction of condition 
and proactive control ability was not significant, F < 1. 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of cues detected in Experiment 2B as a function of prospective 
memory tasks and proactive control ability. 
 
Mean RT cost. The analysis of mean RT cost (Figure 8) revealed an effect of PM 
task, F(1,165) = 232.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .585, with more cost in the nonfocal (M = 165, 
SE = 10) than focal (M = 37, SE = 9) task. As might be expected, cost reliably differed 
from zero in the nonfocal condition, F(1,165) = 285.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .632. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, there cost also reliably differed from zero in the focal condition, 
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F(1,165) = 18.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .102. However, there was no effect of proactive control 
ability on cost, F(1,165) = 2.21, p = .139, and only a nominal interaction of PM task and 
proactive control ability, F(1,165) = 2.88, p = .091. 
 
Figure 8. Mean reaction time cost in Experiment 2B as a function of prospective memory 
tasks and proactive control ability. 
 
Mu Cost. The analysis of mean mu cost (Figure 9) revealed an effect of PM task, 
F(1,165) = 232.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .585, with more cost in the nonfocal (M = 41, SE = 5) 
than focal (M = -5, SE = 4) PM task. As might be expected, this cost reliably differed 
from zero in the nonfocal condition, F(1,165) = 66.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .286. However, 
cost did not reliably differed from zero in the focal condition, F(1,165) = 1.29, p = .258. 
Although there was no effect of proactive control ability on cost, F(1,165) = 1.94, p = 
.165, there was a significant interaction of PM task and proactive control ability, F(1,165) 
= 19.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .104. To explore this interaction, I compared performance 
between participants following in the upper and lower 25% of the proactive control 
ability distribution. 
To explore the interaction of PM task and proactive control ability, mean mu cost 
was submitted to a 2 (PM task: nonfocal vs. focal) x 2 (PC: high vs. low) mixed-factorial 
ANOVA. Similar to the unrestricted analysis, this analysis revealed an effect of PM task, 
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F(1,80) = 77.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .493, with more cost in the nonfocal than focal PM task. 
Although there was no effect of proactive control ability, F(1,80) = 1.58, p = .213, there 
was a significant interaction of PM task and proactive control ability, F(1,80) = 13.54, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .145. This interaction primarily reflects that while high proactive control 
ability participants exhibited more cost than low proactive control participants in the 
nonfocal condition, F(1,80) = 6.83, p = .011, ηp2 = .079, there were no cost differences 
between high and low proactive control participants in the focal condition, F < 1. 
Furthermore, cost did not reliably differ from zero for either group in the focal condition, 
F < 1. 
 
Figure 9. Mean mu cost in Experiment 2B as a function of prospective memory tasks and 
proactive control ability. 
 
Tau Cost. The analysis of mean tau cost (Figure 10) revealed an effect of PM 
task, F(1,165) = 145.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .471, with more cost in the nonfocal (M = 123, 
SE = 9) than focal (M = 39, SE = 8) PM task. As might be expected, cost reliably differed 
from zero in the nonfocal condition, F(1,165) = 199.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .546. 
Additionally, cost reliably differed from zero in the focal condition, F(1,165) = 25.02, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .131. This finding suggests that the mean RT cost in the focal condition was 
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primarily due increases in tau. However, there was no effect of proactive control ability 
on cost, F(1,165) = 2.21, p = .139, and no interaction of PM task and proactive control 
ability, F’s < 1. 
 
Figure 10. Mean tau cost in Experiment 2B as a function of prospective memory tasks 
and proactive control ability. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results from Experiment 2B are generally consistent with those from 
Experiment 2A. High proactive control individuals were more successful at detecting 
cues than were low proactive control participants. Furthermore, high proactive control 
participants were more likely to engage continuous monitoring processes in the nonfocal 
cue condition, as evidenced by greater mu relative to low proactive control participants. 
Additionally, in the nonfocal cue condition mu was positively correlated with cue 
detection (r = .172, p = .026), but tau was not (r = .078, p = .316). These findings again 
suggest that proactive control processes may be beneficial for engaging continuous 
monitoring processes to support cue detection during nonfocal processing conditions. 
Importantly, however, high proactive control participants did not appear to 
inappropriately engage continuous monitoring processes during the focal processing 
condition. Although there was cost in the focal condition (which likely has to do with the 
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number of cues
1
 and the counterbalancing procedure), this cost was due entirely to 
increases in tau. These findings suggest that high proactive control participants are able to 
appropriately disengage continuous monitoring processes under scenarios that do not 
require costly monitoring.  
                                                          
1
 Typically during focal processing conditions participants are given only a single PM cue (e.g., packet). 
However, in the current study I instructed participants to respond to two PM cues (e.g., packet and dancer). 
This was done because in the nonfocal condition, replicating the previous studies four of the “TOR” cues 
were living (e.g., doctor), whereas four of the “TOR” cues were nonliving (e.g., tractor). Thus, I did not 
want participants in the focal condition to increase processing for only a single item type (e.g., living 
things) and the expense of the other item type (e.g., nonliving) if the only cue that was to appear was 
something living (e.g., dancer). 
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Chapter 4 
EXPERIMENTS 3A AND 3B: OVERVIEW 
 Each of the previous studies examined how individual differences in proactive 
control abilities affects reliance on continuous versus transient monitoring processes and 
whether or not certain experimental manipulations (i.e., importance instructions, focal 
versus nonfocal PM) could change the type of processing that is implemented to support 
cue detection. However, while ex-Gaussian analyses can be used to infer the regularity in 
which control processes enacted, they do not provide any information on the retrieval 
processes that are enacted upon encountering cues. Thus, the purpose of Experiments 3A 
and 3B was examine the behavioral consequences and neural correlates of cue detection, 
within the same individual, across ongoing task contexts that affect reliance on proactive 
versus reactive control processes.  
 One task that has been used to bias reliance on proactive versus reactive control 
processes is a modified version of the Simon Task in which proportion congruency is 
context specific (e.g., Blais & Bunge, 2010). In the modified Simon Task, the letter X or 
O is presented in one of four locations (top-left, top-right, bottom-left, or bottom-right) 
and participants are to press the left button when an X appears and the right button when 
an O appears. Half of the trials are congruent where the stimulus is consistent with 
response mapping (e.g., X appears on left side of display), whereas the other half are 
incongruent (e.g., X appears on right side of screen). Critically, proportion congruency is 
manipulated such that the stimuli presented on the top half of the display are mostly 
congruent, whereas the stimuli on the bottom half of the display are mostly incongruent. 
It is typically found that the size of the Simon Effect (i.e., slower responding on 
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incongruent trials) is larger in the mostly congruent context than the mostly incongruent 
context. It is suggested that this proportion congruency effect occurs because during 
mostly incongruent blocks participants implicitly adopt a proactive control strategy to 
minimize interference due to response competition (Blais et al., 2012; De Pisapia & 
Braver, 2006; Kane & Engle, 2003). Thus, it is possible that embedding PM cues in 
either mostly congruent or mostly incongruent contexts may stimulate different PM 
retrieval processes. 
EXPERIMENT 3A 
 Experiment 3A was conducted to examine the behavioral consequences of cue 
detection depending on whether PM cues were presented in mostly congruent or 
incongruent contexts. In the PM version of the modified Simon task, the standard 
ongoing task trials consisted of a series of X’s and O’s presented all in the same color 
(e.g., red). For the PM intention, participants were instructed to make a PM response 
(instead of the normal ongoing task response) any time a stimulus was presented in a 
specified color (e.g., blue). Due to the saliency of the PM cues (i.e., a rare blue stimulus 
amidst mostly red stimuli), they should be noticed fairly easily. However, to successfully 
respond to PM cues participant must inhibit their prepotent ongoing task response 
tendency to instead make a PM response. Thus, because participants are adopting a 
proactive control strategy to reduce interference in the mostly incongruent context, it 
should be easier to inhibit a prepotent response tendency in service of the PM intention. 
In contrast, because participants rely on more reactive control processes to reduce 
interference on the small number of trials that are incongruent in the mostly congruent 
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context, participants may be more likely to accidently make a target response on cue 
trials.  
METHOD 
Participants  
Thirty-four participants were recruited for participation in a behavioral version 
(i.e., no EEG) of the experiment that lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Subjects participated in a modified Simon task, as follows. A central fixation 
marker remained on the screen for the duration of the block. The letter X or O was 
presented in one of four locations (top-left, top-right, bottom-left, or bottom-right). 
Subjects were asked to respond to the letter on the screen by pressing a left or right-hand 
button (counterbalanced across individuals) with the appropriate index finger. The target 
remained on the screen until the response was executed. The response was immediately 
followed by a uniformly distributed variable intertrial interval lasting between 500 ms 
and 1000 ms inclusive, in 17 ms increments, during which the fixation marker remained 
on the screen. Thus, from the point of view of the participant, there was a + sign on the 
center of the screen and then approximately every 1.5 s (depending on their RT) an X or 
O appeared in one of four corners.  
 There were 116 trials total in each block of the experiment, with 10 total blocks. 
Two of the blocks were “control” blocks in which there was no PM intention (block 
number 1 and 6), whereas the remaining 8 blocks contained PM cues. For the control 
blocks, participants were instructed to perform the task normally and that the colors were 
irrelevant to the task, whereas for the PM blocks participants were instructed to press the 
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spacebar with their thumb whenever a stimulus of a specified color (e.g., red) was 
encountered. There were a total of  96 standard (non-cue) trials, 8 control (non-cue) trials, 
and 8 PM cue trials. PM cues did not occur until 20
th
 trial, and then appeared every 12 
trials for the remainder of the block. 
 Stimuli were either presented in red, blue, or yellow, which were unique to each 
of the different trial types, counterbalanced across participants. Half of the trials were 
congruent and the other half were incongruent. A congruent trial was one in which the 
location of the stimulus was consistent with the response mapping. For example, if the 
participant was to press the left button when he or she saw an X, then a congruent trial 
occurred when the X is presented on the left half of the screen, and the O was presented 
on the right half of the screen. Whether the stimulus was on the top or bottom of the 
screen affected the probability of the stimulus being congruent. For half of the 
participants, items appearing on the top of the screen were 75% congruent (i.e., 36 
congruent trials and 12 incongruent trials) and items appearing on the bottom of the 
screen were 25% congruent (i.e., 12 congruent trials and 36 incongruent trials). For the 
other half of the participants, the proportion congruency across top and bottom halves of 
the screen was the opposite. For the control and cue trials, one of each was presented as 
and X and an O in one of the 4 quadrants, half as a congruent and half as an incongruent 
trial.  
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RESULTS 
Ongoing task performance. To examine the context specific proportion 
congruency effect and the ongoing task cost due to possessing an intention, I submitted 
mean RTs
2
 on correct standard trials to a 2 (block: control vs. experimental) x 2 (context: 
mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 (congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) 
repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 11). This analysis revealed an effect of block, 
F(1,33) = 14.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .312, and congruency, F(1,33) = 28.96, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.467, with faster RTs in the control block and on congruent trials. Although there was no 
effect of context, F < 1, there was an interaction of context and congruency, F(1,33) = 
7.05, p = .012, ηp2 = .176. This interaction reflects the typical CSPC effect whereby the 
Simon effect (i.e., incongruent RT – congruent RT) is greater for the mostly congruent 
(M = 32, SE = 5) than the mostly incongruent (M = 17, SE = 5) context. There were no 
other significant interaction effects (all p’s > .07). In summary, these results found that 
there was cost to ongoing task performance as a result of possessing an intention, and that 
the Simon effect is greater in the mostly congruent context. 
 
Figure 11. Mean reaction time on standard trials in Experiment 3A as a function of 
congruency and context. 
                                                          
2
 Analyses of ongoing task accuracy generally parallel those of the mean reaction times, so for simplicity I 
only report the latter here and in subsequent analyses.  
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Cue detection. The proportion of successfully detected cues in the experimental 
block was submitted to a 2 (context: mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 
(congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 12). This 
analysis revealed an effect of context, F(1,33) = 4.60, p = .039, ηp2 = .122, with greater 
cue detection in the mostly incongruent context. There was also an effect of congruency, 
F(1,33) = 5.0, p = .032, ηp2 = .132, with greater cue detection on incongruent than 
congruent trials. However, there was no interaction of context and congruency, F < 1. 
The main effects of context and congruency mainly reflect that cue detection was worst 
on congruent trials in the mostly congruent context, whereas performance was the best on 
incongruent trials in the mostly incongruent context. Post-hoc analyses revealed that there 
was only an effect of congruency on cue detection in the mostly congruent context, 
F(1,33) = 4.50 p = .041, ηp2 = .120, and not in the mostly incongruent context  (F < 1.2). 
 
Figure 12. Mean cue detection in Experiment 3A as a function of congruency and 
context. 
 
Prospective Memory RTs. I also examined whether participants differentially 
slowed when making their PM response as a function of item type by submitting cue 
detection RTs to a 2 (context: mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 (congruency: 
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congruent vs. incongruent) repeated-measures ANOVA. However, this analysis revealed 
no effects of context or congruency, and no interaction between the two (all p’s > .23). 
I also compared RTs across item type by submitting mean RTs to a 2 (context: 
mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 (congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) x 
3 (item type: PM vs. control vs. standard) repeated-measures ANOVA. This analysis 
revealed an effect of congruency, F(1,33) = 12.54, p = .001, ηp2 = .275, with faster RTs 
on congruent than incongruent trials. There was also an effect of item type, F(1,33) = 
170.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .914. The effect of item type reflects both PM (M = 673, SE = 14) 
and control (M = 672, SE = 22) trial RTs were significantly slower than standard (M = 
490, SE = 10) trials RTs, F(1,33) = 206.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .862, and F(1,33) = 146.58, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .816, respectively. However, there were no RT differences between PM and 
control trials, F < 1. 
DISCUSSION 
 The results from the behavioral task are fairly straight forward. Consistent with 
previous research (Blais & Bunge, 2010), on standard ongoing task trials participants 
demonstrated the typical context specific proportion congruency (CSPC) effect whereby 
the Simon effect was larger in the mostly congruent than mostly incongruent context. As 
is typical, this effect was primarily driven by increases in RTs on incongruent trials in the 
mostly congruent context. This finding suggests that participants were engaging more 
reactive control processes that involve trying to reduce interference after its onset on the 
rare trials in which incongruent trials occurred. In regard to PM performance, cue 
detection was better overall on incongruent trials and in the mostly incongruent context. 
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Interestingly, however, cue detection only differed between the congruent and 
incongruent stimuli in the mostly congruent context. In conjunction with the CSPC effect, 
these findings suggest that participants may have been engaging more reactive control 
processes in the mostly congruent context and were therefore more likely to miss cues 
(particularly when cues appeared on congruent trials). In contrast, when participants were 
engaging more proactive control processes in the mostly incongruent context, they were 
more likely to be prepared for response conflict and were therefore better able to fulfill 
the intention regardless of item congruency.  
EXPERIMENT 3B 
Experiment 3B was conducted to examine the behavioral consequences and 
neural correlates of cue detection depending on whether or not cues were presented on 
mostly congruent or incongruent contexts. Presumably, if engagement of proactive versus 
reactive control processes bias the cognitive system to process incoming stimuli 
differently, differences in the neural correlates of PM noticing and retrieval processes 
may be observed when cues are presented in mostly congruent relative to incongruent 
contexts.   
In particular, there are two neural signatures that have been commonly associated 
with PM. The N300 is negative deflection over occipital-parietal regions that is greater 
for PM cues than standard trials. The N300 is thought to reflect detection of the cue 
(West, 2011). Additionally, the parietal positivity is a sustained positive going deflection 
that occurs approximately 400 ms post-stimulus onset and is a result of three distinct 
components: the P3b (novelty detection), parietal old/new effect (recognition memory; 
West & Krompinger, 2005), and the prospective positivity. Of particular interest in the 
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current study is the prospective positivity, which occurs approximately 400-800 ms post-
stimulus onset over parietal regions and is thought to reflect coordination between PM 
and ongoing task and post-retrieval monitoring processes (Bisiacchi et al., 2009). 
Bisiacchi et al. compared ERPs in two different types of PM tasks, one that required 
making the PM response instead of the ongoing task response (task-switching), and one 
that required first making the ongoing task response followed by the PM response (dual-
task). Although there were no N300 differences associated with noticing the cue, the 
prospective positivity was greater in the task-switching condition that placed greater 
demands on inhibitory processes needed to execute the intended action. Based on these 
findings, it was predicted that in the current study the prospective positivity would be 
greater for successfully detected cues in mostly congruent relative to the mostly 
incongruent context. The rationale behind this is that participants in the mostly 
incongruent context are already engaging proactive control processes to reduce 
interference, and therefore it should be easier to switch from the ongoing to PM task in 
this context.  
METHOD 
Participants 
 Twenty Arizona State University undergraduate students enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course participated in the study that last approximately 75 
minutes.  Students received course credit for their participation in the study. However, 
two participants were excluded from all analyses due excessive artifact during EEG 
recording.   
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Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were nearly identical to the behavioral study, but 
was lengthened to get more measurements per participant. The only differences between 
the behavioral and EEG studies were that in the latter, there were 15 blocks (3 control, 
with one in each third of the experiment) each containing 160 trials. Each block consisted 
of 128 standard (non-cue) trials, 16 control (non-cue) trials, and 16 PM cue trials. PM 
cues did not appear until the 32
nd
 trial and were presented every 8 trials for the remainder 
of the block. 
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS 
Ongoing task performance. To examine the context specific proportion 
congruency effect and the ongoing task cost due to possessing an intention, I submitted 
mean RTs on correct standard trials to a 2 (block: control vs. experimental) x 2 (context: 
mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 (congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) 
repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 13). This analysis revealed an effect of block, 
F(1,17) = 60.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .78, and congruency, F(1,17) = 155.72, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.902, with faster RTs in the control block and on congruent trials. Although there was no 
effect of context, F < 1, there was an interaction of context and congruency, F(1,17) = 
10.78, p = .004, ηp2 = .388. This interaction reflects the typical CSPC effect whereby the 
Simon effect (i.e., incongruent RT – congruent RT) was greater for the mostly congruent 
(M = 42, SE = 4) than the mostly incongruent (M = 22, SE = 3) context. There were no 
other significant interaction effects (all p’s > .16). In summary, these results found that 
there was cost to ongoing task performance as a result of possessing an intention, and that 
the Simon effect is greater in the mostly congruent context. 
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Figure 13. Mean reaction time on standard trials in Experiment 3B as a function of 
congruency and context. 
 
Cue Detection. The proportion of successfully detected cues in the experimental 
block was submitted to a 2 (context: mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 
(congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 14). This 
analysis revealed no effect of context, F < 1, but an effect of congruency, F(1,17) = 4.76, 
p = .043, ηp2 = .219. There was also a marginal interaction of context and congruency, 
F(1,17) = 3.79, p = .068, ηp2 = .182. The marginal interaction primarily reflects that there 
was an effect of congruency on cue detection in the mostly congruent context, F(1,17) = 
8.04 p = .011, ηp2 = .321, and not in the mostly incongruent context , F < 1. 
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Figure 14. Mean cue detection in Experiment 3A as a function of congruency and 
context. 
 
Prospective Memory RTs. I also examined whether participants differentially 
slowed when making their PM response as a function of item type by submitting cue 
detection RTs to a 2 (context: mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 (congruency: 
congruent vs. incongruent) repeated-measures ANOVA. However, this analysis revealed 
no effects of context or congruency, and no interaction between the two (all p’s > .26). 
Thus, participants were equally slowed in making their PM responses regardless of trial 
type. 
I also compared RTs across item type by submitting mean RTs to a 2 (context: 
mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 (congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) x 
3 (item type: PM vs. control vs. standard) repeated-measures ANOVA. This analysis 
revealed an effect of congruency, F(1,17) = 16.72, p = .001, ηp2 = .496, with faster RTs 
on congruent than incongruent trials. There was also an effect of item type, F(1,17) = 
52.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .867. The effect of item type reflects both PM (M = 646, SE = 34) 
and control (M = 539, SE = 23) trial RTs were significantly slower than standard (M = 
462, SE = 17) trials RTs, F(1,17) = 63.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .788, and F(1,17) = 98.32, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .853, respectively. Additionally, PM RTs were slower than control RTs, 
F(1,17) = 27.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .616. There was also an interaction of item type and 
congruency, F(1,17) = 17.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .680, and of context and congruency, 
F(1,17) = 7.98, p = .012, ηp2 = .319. No other effects or interactions were significant (all 
p’s > .35). Follow-up analyses in which PM was separately compared to control and 
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standard trials revealed that the nature interaction in both cases was due to the fact that 
congruency had no influence on PM RTs (as demonstrated in the previous analyses only 
examining PM RTs), whereas congruent trials were faster than incongruent trials for both 
control and standard trials. In sum, the analyses of PM RTs revealed no differences in 
RTs across context or congruency, but overall these RTs were slower than both control 
and standard trials. 
ERP RESULTS 
 Prospective positivity. As can be seen in Figure 15, there were large differences 
in ERP amplitude across trial types that emerged around 300 ms and continued for 
another 500 ms (Figure 15). Based on previous research and visual inspection of ERP 
onset across item types, the prospective positivity was quantified as the mean amplitude 
between 300-400 ms
3
 over the parietal area (electrode Pz). Mean amplitude was analyzed 
in a 2 (context: mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 (congruency: congruent vs. 
incongruent) x 3 (item type: PM Hit vs. control vs. standard) repeated-measures 
ANOVA
4
. This analyses revealed an effect of item type, F(1,17) = 10.33, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.564. However, there was no effect of context or congruency, and no higher order 
interactions, F’s < 2.73, p’s > .09. Follow-up analyses revealed that there were no 
amplitude differences between control and standard trials, F’s < 1. However, mean 
                                                          
3
 Although the prospective positivity typically emerges approximately 400-500 ms post-stimulus onset 
(West, 2007), the reaction times in the current study were considerably faster than other studies examining 
the effect. Thus, based on reaction time differences and visual inspection of the onset of the positivity 
across all items types, the time-window for analyses was selected to be 300-400 ms.  
4
 Although PM misses are plotted in the Figure 15, these trial types were not analyzed. Overall, cue 
detection was high so there were relatively few misses in general. Furthermore, there were several 
participants with perfect cue detection, and others with perfect cue detection on certain trial types (e.g., 
incongruent trials in mostly congruent).  
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amplitude was greater for PM hits than control and standard items, F(1,17) = 21.94, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .563, and F(1,17) = 18.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .527, respectively. 
 
Figure 15. Grand-averaged ERPs collapsed across congruency and context portraying the 
prospective positivity (300-400 ms) for prospective memory (PM) hits, prospective 
memory (PM) misses, control items, and standard items at electrode Pz. 
 
 Of particular interest in the context of the current study was the effect of context 
and congruency on PM hits (Figure 16). Thus, we additionally submitted mean amplitude 
for PM hits to a 2 (context: mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent) x 2 (congruency: 
congruent vs. incongruent) repeated-measures ANOVA. However, this analysis failed to 
reveal an effect of context or congruency, F’s < 1, and no interaction between the two, F 
< 1.  
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Figure 16. Grand-averaged ERPs collapsed portraying the prospective positivity (300-
400 ms) for prospective memory hits as a function of congruency and context at electrode 
Pz. MC = mostly congruent context; MI = mostly incongruent context; Cong = congruent 
trial; Incong = incongruent trial. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3B: DISCUSSION 
The behavioral results Experiment 3B are generally consistent with those found in 
Experiment 3A. In particularly, participants demonstrated a CSPC effect on standard 
trials, and cue detection only differed across item types in the mostly congruent context. 
Again, these findings suggest that participants in the mostly congruent context may have 
been engaging more reactive control processes that resulted in more missed cues on 
congruent relative to incongruent trials. In contrast, when engaging more proactive 
control processes, item type did not have an influence on cue detection.   
In regard to the ERP analyses, it was found that prospective hits distinguished 
between standard and control trials starting around 300 ms post-stimulus onset and was 
maximal over parietal regions. This finding is consistent with previous studies 
demonstrating a prospective positivity around the same latency and topography. It has 
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previously been suggested that the prospective positivity reflects coordination processes 
necessary to inhibit ongoing task responding and switching from the ongoing task to the 
PM task (Bisiacchi et al., 2009). Thus, it was predicted that the prospective positivity 
would be larger on PM hits in the mostly congruent than mostly incongruent context, as it 
would take more control to inhibit the prepotent response tendency in the reactive 
context. However, when comparing the prospective positivity for PM hits across item 
types, no significant effects emerged. One possibility for the null effects was that ERPs 
were only compared on trials in which processing and intention execution was successful 
(i.e., PM hits). However, given the small sample size and small number of PM misses, it 
was not possible to compare hits versus misses across item types.   
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Chapter 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The lion’s share of research on PM costs has been geared toward addressing 
theoretical debates about when cognitive control processes are enacted during event-
based PM (e.g., Einstein & McDaniel, 2010; Smith et al., 2007; Smith, 2010).  However, 
relatively little is known about the nature of these control processes and the regularity in 
which they are enacted. While the study of mean RTs has undoubtedly contributed to our 
understanding of PM, I argue that these measures may not fully capture the underlying 
dynamics of PM monitoring processes involved in detecting cues and retrieving 
intentions.  This point is particularly salient in the context of the current studies where the 
interpretation of the results considerably differs depending on which individual 
differences measures and cost metrics are evaluated. Consistent across Experiments 1 and 
2, when examining only mean RTs proactive control was not associated with PM costs. 
From these findings alone, it would be tempting to conclude that the proactive control 
construct may be capturing attention or memory processes independent of those that 
produce cost. However, ex-Gaussian analyses revealed that the null relation between 
proactive control and mean RTs was due to PM costs being produced primarily by 
increases in mu and a general decrease in tau for high relative to low proactive control 
participants. Together, these findings suggest that natural variation in proactive control 
abilities may affect reliance on continuous (i.e., proactive) and transient (i.e., reactive) 
monitoring processes to support cue detection. Furthermore, it was demonstrated using 
both individual differences (Experiments 1 and 2) and experimental (Experiment 3) 
techniques that proactive control was the optimal processing mode for cue detection. 
63 
 
Furthermore, it was also found that reliance on these various types of processing modes is 
mutable in the context of PM (Experiment 2). These results highlight the importance of 
the converging operations approach towards understanding PM phenomenon, and that ex-
Gaussian analyses may serve to improve current theorizing of the mechanisms underlying 
PM performance. 
 I have previously argued that variation in continuous and transient monitoring 
processes are captured by mu and tau, respectively, in the ex-Gaussian analyses. 
Interestingly, although the optimal processing strategy during nonfocal PM conditions is 
continuous monitoring, previous instantiations of ex-Gaussian analyses somewhat 
surprisingly revealed that cost was solely due to increases in tau (Ball et al., 2014). 
However, more recently Loft et al. (2014) found that cost was due to increases in both mu 
and tau (see also Abney, McBride, & Petrella, 2013). The finding of increased mu is 
more consistent with extant theories of monitoring suggesting that cognitive control 
processes (e.g., preparatory attention, retrieval mode maintenance, target checking, 
strategic monitoring) are enacted on a trial-by-trial basis (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; 
Guynn, 2003; Smith, 2003), whereas the increase in tau suggests that there were 
additional control processes are enacted on subset of trials. Similarly, the results from the 
current set of studies found that cost was typically associated with increases in both mu 
and tau. Interestingly, however, only variation in mu reliably predicted cue detection 
across studies, suggesting that a continuous monitoring strategy is associated with 
increased levels of cue detection. It is likely the case that differences in the current 
studies relative to previous findings reflects differences in the nature of the ongoing task 
and the PM cues to be encountered (see Loft et al., 2014 for a more detailed discussion) 
64 
 
and the fact that the current studies had greater power to detect relatively smaller changes 
in mu given the large sample size. Perhaps more importantly, however, the results from 
the current set of studies suggest that there may be important individual differences 
variables that may affect the reliance on continuous versus transient monitoring 
processes. Furthermore, these findings suggest that these processes may be mutable in the 
context of PM and therefore can be altered to optimize PM performance. 
Cognitive Control Processes in Prospective Memory 
Experiment 1 examined the role of working memory, proactive control, 
inhibition, and vigilance in PM monitoring and cue detection. WMC uniquely predict cue 
detection, whereas both proactive control and inhibition uniquely predicted variability in 
mu. As mentioned previously, the relation between WMC and cue detection may reflect 
long-term memory (Ball et al., 2013) or task-switching (Scnhitzpahn et al., 2013) 
processes. Importantly, however, these processes can only occur following noticing of the 
cue. Thus, it is likely the case the proactive control and inhibitory processes are involved 
in continuous monitoring that, although causes slowing on the majority of ongoing task 
trials, substantially increases the likelihood of noticing cues. The results from Experiment 
3 using the modified Simon task suggest a possible mechanism by which proactive 
control processes may be operating in the animacy judgment task used in Experiments 1 
and 2. In the mostly incongruent context of the Simon task, participants engage proactive 
control to try to reduce interference for the highly likely incongruent stimuli. 
Consequently, the cognitive system is already optimally biased to deal with interference 
on trials in which PM cues that also produce response conflict (i.e., press different key) 
appear. Such a processing mode decrease the likelihood that the ongoing task response 
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will mistakenly be made instead of a PM response. Likewise, in the nonfocal animacy 
judgment task, participants may adopt a more cautious response strategy that allows for 
target checks to be me made that decreases the likelihood of mistakenly making the 
prepotent ongoing task response prior to engaging target checks (Heathcote, Loft, & 
Remington, 2015; Loft & Remington, 2013).  
Although speculative, the distinction between proactive versus reactive control 
processes in context of PM may reflect front-end versus back-end checking processes, 
respectively. Front-end checking would involve checking the stimulus for intention 
relevant information prior to deciding whether the item is living or not (e.g., “Does 
stimulus contain TOR syllable? Yes. Is it living? Yes.”), whereas back-end checking 
processes would involve first making the animacy decision followed the target check 
(e.g., “Is stimulus living? Yes. Does it contain TOR syllable? Yes.”). Front-end checking 
mechanisms would allow for inhibitory processes to be instantiated to increase the 
likelihood of making the PM response and signal for WMC processes associated with 
task-switching to coordinate processing from the ongoing to PM task. Importantly, 
although the front-end checking mechanisms would be more efficacious for cue 
detection, they should also produce more substantial slowing on a majority of trials. In 
contrast, the back-end checking mechanisms may reduce interference on the majority of 
ongoing task trials, but nevertheless produce substantial slowing on trials in which the 
PM intention was reactivated (similar to slowing seen on incongruent trials in the mostly 
congruent context). Importantly, back-end checking processes may increase the 
probability that a cue would be missed or the prepotent ongoing task response tendency is 
executed prior to the intention. Of course, the correlation between reactive control 
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abilities was inconsistent across studies. Thus, future work is needed to better understand 
the relation between the cognitive control processes associated with more transient 
monitoring processes. 
Improving Prospective Memory 
The DMC framework posits that various situational and individual differences 
factors produce biases in reliance on proactive and reactive control processing modes in 
various cognitive control tasks (Braver, 2012). Consistent with this idea, the studies 
presented here demonstrated that situational (e.g., importance instructions) and individual 
differences factors (e.g., proactive control abilities) influenced reliance on proactive 
control processes in the context of PM. Importantly, however, reliance on proactive 
versus reactive control processes appear to be mutable. This idea is consistent with 
previous PM theorizing that suggests that participants are sensitive to demands of the PM 
task and that they adjust their attentional-allocation policies accordingly to optimize 
performance (Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005). The results from Experiments 2A and 2B 
demonstrated that performance between low and high proactive control participants were 
similar if given the right type of encoding instructions (e.g., emphasizing importance of 
the intention) or PM intention (e.g., focal intention). Although previous research has 
shown similar findings in regard to individual differences in WMC (at least in regard to 
focal PM; Brewer et al., 2010), the results from these studies more specifically suggest 
that proactive control and inhibition processes should be targeted to improve PM. 
Furthermore, although it is generally the case that tau is predictive of various 
performance across a variety of attention control studies (e.g., Schmiedek et al., 2007; 
Tse et al., 2010; Unsworth et al., 2011; Unsworth et al., & Young, 2010), the results from 
67 
 
the current set of studies suggest that identifying variables that influence mu may be most 
beneficial for understanding that mechanisms that contribute to PM. Finally, the results 
from the current set of studies suggest that proactive control variation may be useful for 
classifying which participants will rely on proactive and reactive monitoring processes 
during nonfocal processing conditions in which proactive control is optimal. Future 
experimental and individual differences will hopefully bring more theoretical clarity to 
the underlying cognitive control processes that support prospective memory along with 
providing critical information for application focused PM interventions. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the current set of studies used experimental, individual differences, 
quasi-experimental, and neuroscience techniques in conjunction with RT distribution 
fitting to provide novel insights about the nature of PM costs and the regularity in which 
cognitive control processes are enacted.  PM costs occur in many different contexts and 
they lead to ongoing task decrements that may be detrimental to many aspects of healthy 
living.  Accounting for the underlying cognitive control processes that create these costs 
can provide researchers with tools for developing strategic interventions that can 
facilitate ongoing task cognitive processing that is unrelated to PM while simultaneously 
improving PM abilities.  Individual differences studies may also be useful for tailoring 
these interventions in nuanced ways that appropriately calibrate an individual’s 
recognition of the situational factors and their reliance on the appropriate cognitive 
control strategies that will ultimately facilitate their prospective memory abilities. 
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